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We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing(PP), whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay. We
embed PP in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms’ choices over quality. We
show that firms’ optimal pricing strategies with PP may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations. When the
PP firm has high quality, both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when
the PP firm has low quality, both firms lower their qualities. Although many firms are trying to implement such
pricing policies, we find that a higher-quality firm can actually be worse off with PP. While it is optimal for the
firm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving
in closer in the quality space. While PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price
competition between firms. Because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function
determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of first-degree price
discrimination, we find that PP with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.
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1. Introduction
Different consumers typically derive different value
from the same product. Firms often respond to this
heterogeneity in valuations by trying to determine
what customers will pay. This is done in a vari-
ety of ways: by understanding the nature of a cus-
tomer’s business and how the product will be used,
by asking about their budget during a negotiation, or
via market research using different collaborative and
content-filtering techniques. The information about
willingness to pay is then used to provide a person-
alized price for the customer.
In this paper, we use the term personalized pricing,
or PP, to refer to the limiting case in which a firm can
implement a pricing policy based on complete knowl-
edge of the willingness to pay of each consumer.1
1 Because the amount of information required for implementing
PP is high, in practice, firms may not know valuations precisely.
Hence, our results should be interpreted as the solution to an
important limiting case that provides a useful benchmark—the case
of perfect information.
We bypass the question of how the firm acquires this
knowledge. Rather, we focus on the implications this
has for firm strategies. Specifically, we examine the
following questions: (i) How does competition affect
equilibrium product quality outcomes when firms
engage in PP? (ii) Does the improvement in firms’
knowledge of individual consumers alleviate or inten-
sify price competition? (iii) What are the trade-offs
firms face in adopting PP? (iv) How does PP affect
consumer welfare?
Examples of PP come from the markets for both
consumer and business products. Firms selling large
proprietary enterprise-level software often finalize the
price through a negotiation. Vendors typically work
with clients to conduct a return on investment (ROI)
analysis to determine the benefit (in the form of cost
savings or revenue enhancements) of the product to
the client. Sweeney et al. (2002) describe such a collab-
orative development of ROI by Teradata Inc. in fos-
tering sales of its data-warehousing technology. The
ROI analysis is used to price software. For instance,
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a California-based in-store demand-planning software
developer sets the price as a percentage of a mutually
determined ROI. This is also common practice in the
sale of enterprise telephone cost auditing software.2
The market for computer servers, storage devices,
and workstations in the Asia-Pacific region com-
bines PP and quality differentiation. Major players
such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Sun Microsys-
tems use personalized discounting for different cus-
tomers based on ROI, even at the same quality levels.
There is also a trend towards increasing the degree
of service quality and value-added software differ-
entiation in the industry. For instance, in the UNIX
platform, HP and IBM cater to the high-end mar-
ket, while Sun serves the low-end market (TechWise
Research, Inc. 1999). Other examples of value-based
PP are found in the healthcare (Smith and Nagle 2002)
and chemicals industries.
Online retailers with their ability to collect data
are well positioned to take advantage of dynamic
pricing. In a well-known example, Amazon offered
different prices to different consumers on its popu-
lar DVD titles (Morneau 2000). Although Amazon’s
experiment was short-lived due to a consumer back-
lash, it has since found innovative ways of imple-
menting PP without annoying consumers, through
the use of the “Gold Box.” Each consumer is provided
access to a prominently displayed Gold Box with their
name (e.g., John Doe’s Gold Box) on web pages at
Amazon. Opening the Gold Box provides access to
a limited number of products with special discounts
that are not available outside the Gold Box. The items
offered in the Gold Box are different for different con-
sumers. This allows Amazon to charge personalized
prices. This is an example of the continuing evolution
of PP and an indication of the likely use of such pric-
ing by online retailers. Chen and Iyer (2002) mention
several other examples of customized pricing,3 and
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) provide an empirical
study that compares several approaches for determin-
ing consumer willingness to pay.
We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly
framework in which one or both firms can perfectly
identify valuations of heterogenous consumers.4
2 These anecdotes were communicated to us in conversations with
Steve Acterman, Director Corporate IT Management, Volt Infor-
mation Sciences; Harnish Kanani, Senior Vice President Global
Services, Emagia Corporation; and Tim Johnson, Account Execu-
tive, Apreo Inc.
3 These include major providers of long-distance telephone service
(such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint), direct marketing companies like
Land’s End and L. L. Bean, who have individual specific catalog
prices, and financial services and banks, who engage in PP through
personalized discounts on card fees. Zhang (2003) mentions Wells
Fargo and MBNA in this regard.
4 We ignore the possibility of mistargeting. Chen et al. (2001) show
that mistargeting can have an important effect by softening price
A monopolist with such information could engage in
first-degree price discrimination. As Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) point out, the literature on competi-
tive price discrimination is not as extensive as in the
monopoly case. They provide an elegant framework
that incorporates much of the earlier work on price
competition in an environment with multiple firms.
Recent work on customer recognition and behavior-
based price discrimination includes Villas-Boas (1999)
and Acquisti and Varian (2005). Much of the recent
work on perfect price discrimination has been done
either in the context of horizontal product differentia-
tion (Thisse and Vives 1988, Chen and Iyer 2002, Ulph
and Vulkan 2002, Bhaskar and To 2004) or monopoly
(Aron et al. 2005). Shaffer and Zhang (2002) consider
perfect price discrimination by competing firms in
a model that includes both horizontal and vertical
differentiation. Desai (2001) analyzes second-degree
price discrimination with both vertical and horizon-
tal differentiation. Dellaert and Syam (2002) bring
into focus the issues surrounding mass customiza-
tion via an analysis of consumer-producer interaction.
We contribute to the literature in this field by incor-
porating perfect price discrimination in a vertically
differentiated duopolistic setting. Because our paper
examines the issue of how firms’ knowledge of indi-
vidual customers affects the nature of their strate-
gic interactions, it complements the work done on
how customers’ knowledge about firms may affect
firms’ competitive strategies (Lal and Sarvary 1999
and Zettelmeyer 2000).
We derive a number of analytical results on firm
pricing, quality differentiation, and consumer welfare
when one or both firms have PP. First, if the firm with
PP has low quality, its optimal price is nonmonotonic
in consumers’ willingness to pay. That is, some high-
valuation consumers are offered lower prices than
some low-valuation ones. Second, when one firm
adopts PP, the other firm responds by lowering its
price. This is a competitive response: A firm with
PP knows the valuation of each consumer, and can
therefore charge prices as low as its own marginal cost
to a specific consumer. It therefore encroaches into
the market share of the other firm, which responds
to the increased competition by reducing its price.
Third, when only one of the firms adopts PP, it
is optimal for it to increase product differentiation.
This can be interpreted as a move to reduce com-
petition with the other firm. When the cost of qual-
ity is quadratic, if the low-quality firm adopts PP,
both firms reduce their quality levels. Conversely,
when the high-quality firm adopts PP, both firms
increase their quality levels. We show that when
competition in the market and qualitatively changing the incentives
for competing firms engaged in individual marketing.
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both firms adopt PP, the high-quality firm reduces its
quality, while the low-quality firm raises its quality.
Finally, consumer surplus falls (compared to the no
PP case) if the PP firm has low quality, but rises if the
PP firm has high quality. In fact, consumer surplus is
highest when both firms have PP.
In addition to the above results, for a wide range
of cost parameters, we demonstrate some properties
of firm profit with PP. First, within this range, it is a
dominant strategy for the low-quality firm to adopt
PP. That is, regardless of whether the high-quality
firm adopts PP or not, the low-quality firm makes
a higher profit with PP. Conversely, the high-quality
firm can actually be worse off with PP, and should
adopt PP only if the costs of quality are not too steep.
This paradox emerges because in a vertical differen-
tiation context, the other firm responds by lowering
its quality. Next, if marginal costs sharply increase
in quality, then both firms earn lower profits com-
pared to the case where neither has PP. Essentially,
they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.5 However,
if costs are not too convex, both firms increase profits
when they adopt PP. Thus, our paper highlights that
the cost-of-quality effect can lead to circumstances
wherein firms can avoid the prisoner’s dilemma situ-
ation when they both have PP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly describes the model. In §3, we show
that when only one firm has PP, there are two pos-
sible equilibria, with the PP firm having either a
low quality or a high quality.6 We next consider the
case of both firms using PP. In §4, we analyze the
impact of PP on firms’ profits and consumer sur-
plus. This allows us to consider the question of when
firms will adopt PP. We discuss some implications
of our findings in §5. All proofs are relegated to the
online appendix (at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/
ecompanion.html).
2. Model
We consider PP in a duopoly model of vertical differ-
entiation.7 Two firms compete in both the quality and
price of the products they offer. Formally, we model
their competition as a three-stage game. At the first
stage, firms simultaneously choose the quality levels
5 Thisse and Vives (1988) obtain similar results in models of price
discrimination.
6 We do not consider the question of which equilibrium will
emerge. In our model, neither firm has the option of forcing the
other into a particular equilibrium.
7 Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986),
building on research by Mussa and Rosen (1978), develop duopoly
models of vertical differentiation and show that to reduce price
competition, firms seek maximal product differentiation. Moorthy
(1988) extends the basic model by incorporating variable produc-
tion costs and allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy
a product. This results in less than maximal product differentiation.
of their products. At Stage 2, the firms choose their
prices. When neither firm has access to PP, prices
are chosen simultaneously. When only one firm has
access to PP, the firm without PP chooses its price
first, followed by the firm with access to PP. PP is exe-
cuted for each consumer at the point of sale. Hence,
a firm that engages in PP chooses its price after a
rival that has a uniform pricing policy (which must
be posted and committed to before sales occur). In
other words, the flexibility implied by PP incorpo-
rates an implicit assumption on flexibility in timing as
well. When both firms have PP, the order of moves at
Stage 2 does not affect the outcome; for convenience,
we again posit that prices are chosen simultaneously.
Once prices are chosen, at the last stage of the game
(Stage 3), consumers decide which, if any, product
to buy.
If a consumer purchases a product of quality q at
price p, his utility is U = q − p, where  ∈ 01	.
A consumer has positive utility for one unit only.
The type parameter  indicates a consumer’s marginal
valuation for quality. For any given quality, a con-
sumer with a higher  is willing to pay more for the
product than one with a lower . If either of the two
products offers a positive net utility, a consumer buys
the one that maximizes his surplus. Otherwise, he
chooses not to buy either product. It is immediate to
show in this model that, if the qualities of the firms
are the same, PP adds no value—the result is Bertrand
competition, with both firms pricing at marginal cost.
Hence, in this paper, we consider a model in which
firms first choose qualities (which will be different in
equilibrium), and then prices.
Consistent with prior literature, we assume that
firms have a marginal cost of production that is
invariant with the quantity, but depends on the qual-
ity, of the product. That is, both firms have the same
cost function, but depending on the quality levels
they choose, their marginal costs may differ in equi-
librium. Each firm has a constant marginal cost for
producing the good, denoted by c. Further, c· is
twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
convex in q. That is, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. Quality in this
model is a broad notion that encompasses any fea-
ture that may affect a consumer’s willingness to pay
for a good. These could include features intrinsic to
the product itself (such as durability and functional-
ity), or those related to the quality of the shopping
experience, or the service level provided by the firm
(such as warranties and customer service). Quality is
observed perfectly by all consumers.
Given the quality levels and prices offered by the
two firms, consumers make their choices. Suppose, in
the benchmark case of uniform pricing, Firm 1 offers
q1 p1 and Firm 2 offers q2 p2. There will be a sub-
set of consumers (including null) who buy from each
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Figure 1 Consumers’ Purchasing Decision by Consumer Type 
0 1θhθl
Buy product hBuy product lBuy neither product
firm, 1 and 2. The profit of firm j is its market cov-
erage times pj − cqj . In the case of PP, we allow
one or both firms to be exogenously equipped with
a technology that perfectly reveals the consumer’s
type before the price is disclosed to the consumer.
Both firms know which firm has PP before the game is
played. While the firm offers the same quality product
to all consumers, it can choose a personalized price
for each consumer. In this case, firm j’s profit from
consumer  is pj  − cqj . Let cj denote cqj . In
practice, implementing PP may well incur some fixed
costs. However, if such costs are independent of the
quality of the product being offered by the firm, they
do not affect the qualitative nature of the results. For
simplicity, we treat these costs as zero.8 We consider
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this three-
stage game. That is, for any strategies the firms may
choose at Stages 1 and 2, consumers behave optimally
at Stage 3. Firms, in turn, not only anticipate this
behavior, but also choose optimal prices, given qual-
ity levels, at Stage 2. The subgame-perfect equilibrium
is determined by backward induction, starting with
Stage 3.
Consider the case when neither firm has access
to PP (we call this the no-PP case). As shown by
Moorthy (1988), in equilibrium at Stage 3, the firms
share the market in the following manner.9 There exist
threshold consumers h and l such that consumers
with valuations greater than a cutoff level h and less
than 1 purchase product h; and those with valua-
tions between a second cutoff level l and h purchase
product l. This situation is depicted in Figure 1. The
details of the profit equations and reaction functions
are provided in §1.1 of the appendix.
The same intuition also applies in the case in which
one or both firms have PP. Of course, for the equi-
librium to have these properties with both firms
existing, it must be that 0< l < h < 1. In solving the
various cases, we show that an equilibrium with these
properties exists.
3. Duopoly with Personalized Pricing
Suppose first that only one firm has PP. There are two
equilibria in this case: one in which the PP firm has a
8 In §4, we provide guidelines as to when firms should or should
not invest in PP if the fixed costs are nonzero.
9 Moorthy assumes quadratic costs, but this result depends only on
consumer preferences.
lower quality than the other firm, and a second one in
which the PP firm has a higher quality. We consider
each of these, and then examine the case in which
both firms have PP.
3.1. Personalized Pricing Firm Offers Low Quality
We use the superscript l to denote this case, while
the subscripts h, l denote the firms. In the spirit of
backward induction, suppose that firms choose qual-
ities qh, ql at Stage 1, and consider Stage 2 first. Let
plh, p
l
l denote the optimal prices chosen at Stage 2
(as functions of qh, ql). Similarly, let hl , 
l
l denote the
profit functions, as functions of qh and ql alone (that
is, after substituting in the optimal Stage 2 prices). For
brevity, in the notation we often suppress the depen-
dence of these functions on qh, ql (this dependence
is clear in the expressions exhibited below). We use
qhl and q
l
l to denote equilibrium qualities chosen at
Stage 1. A notation guide is provided in the appendix.
We restrict attention to qualities q that satisfy
cq < q. The rationale for this is as follows: The con-
sumer with  = 1 is the one who is willing to pay
the most for a given product with quality q. This con-
sumer is willing to pay up to q for the product. If
cq≥ q, a firm cannot obtain a positive market share
unless it also makes a loss. Regardless of the quality
it chooses at Stage 1, it can always prevent a loss by
charging consumers a price p≥ q, which ensures zero
sales. Hence, we only consider qualities with cq < q.
Because the cost function is convex, it is sufficient to
impose this condition on the higher-quality firm.
In this case, firm l knows the type of each con-
sumer, and hence can offer prices that depend on . It
must be willing to offer a price as low as its marginal
cost, cl = cql, to each consumer, if necessary. Further,
consistent with price discrimination, it will charge
each consumer as high a price as it can. At Stage 3,
firm h (which does not have PP) will operate in a mar-
ket segment h1	, and firm l in a market segment
l h	. Consider first the location of the marginal con-
sumer h, who is indifferent between buying from
either firm. This consumer must obtain the same util-
ity from either product. If pllh > cl, then firm l
would lower its price for this consumer to ensure
that he strictly prefers to buy product l. Hence, it
must be that pllh = cl. Therefore, this consumer is
defined by hqh−plh = hql−cl or h = plh−cl/qh−ql.
For now, the qualities could be arbitrary, so define
h =minplh − cl/qh − ql1. Similarly, l is defined
as the consumer who is indifferent between buying
product l and not consuming at all. Again, it must
be that plll= cl, else firm l could increase its profit
by reducing its price for this consumer. Hence, lql −
cl = 0 or l = cl/ql > 0. Finally, the consumer who is
exactly indifferent between not buying at all and buy-
ing from firm h is defined as  = plh/qh. At arbitrary
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qualities, it may be that this leads to  > 1, so define
=minplh/qh1.
In the pricing subgame, we further restrict attention
to prices that satisfy p ≥ cq for a given quality q.
No firm is willing to sell to consumers at a price less
than its marginal cost (because this results in a loss).
However, for some qualities, there exist equilibria in
the subgame at which firm h may price below its cost,
but makes zero sales. Firm h earns zero profits across
these equilibria, so we consider the equilibrium in
which it prices no lower than its cost, cqh.
Now, consider Stage 2. Suppose that firms have
chosen qualities qh, ql at Stage 1. We show that, at
Stage 2, the optimal price function of firm l is non-
monotonic in consumer type; that is, it charges some
high-valuation consumers less than it charges some
low-valuation consumers.
Proposition 1. Suppose that firms choose any quali-
ties qh and ql at Stage 1, with associated costs ch = cqh
and cl = cql, that satisfy (i) ql < qh and (ii) ch < qh. In
the equilibrium of the pricing subgame starting at Stage 2,
we have 0< l < h ≤ 1. Further,
(a) firm h sets a price
plh =max
{
1/2qh− ql + ch+ cl ch
}

(b) firm l sets a price pll that is nonmonotonic in a
consumer’s valuation , such that some higher-valuation
consumers obtain lower prices than some lower-valuation
ones. Specifically,
pll=


ql if  ∈ l 	
plh− qh− ql if  ∈  h	
cl if  ∈ 0  or  ∈ h1	
This situation is depicted in Figure 2. The intu-
ition is that in the market segment 0 	, firm l faces
no competition from firm h. These consumers are
not willing to buy product h at the offered quality
and price. Hence, firm l is able to extract their entire
consumer surplus. However, consumers in the range
 1	 obtain a positive utility from consuming prod-
uct h as well. Hence, firm l faces competition in this
Figure 2 Prices of Firms l and h When Firm l Alone Has Personalized
Pricing
p (θ)
ph
0 1
c
θ θhθˆ
Firm l ′s market Firm h′s market
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ic
es
 o
fl
,
h
l
l
l
range, and must offer consumers at least as high a
surplus as firm h to induce them to buy product l.
Thus, the threat of latent competition from firm h pro-
vides these consumers with a positive surplus that is
monotonically increasing in their valuations.
Now, consider the choice of qualities at Stage 1. In
Lemma 1 in the appendix, we show that at the equi-
librium qualities, given the prices exhibited in Propo-
sition 1, the threshold consumer types satisfy 0< l <
h < 1. Hence, we ignore the Kuhn-Tucker constraints
implied by these conditions, and focus on the interior
solution.
Suppose that firm l chooses ql and firm h
chooses qh. Further, suppose that both firms choose
optimal prices (as given by Proposition 1), given the
two qualities. Then, the profit functions of the two
firms are
ll qh ql=
∫ 
l
ql−cld+
∫ h

plh−qh−ql−cld
= p
l
hql − qhcl2
2qh− qlqhql
 (1)
lhqh ql= plh− ch1− hplh qh cl ql
= qh− ql − ch+ cl
2
2qh− ql
 (2)
When firm l adopts PP, the competitive response of
firm h is to reduce its price. This is the “price compe-
tition effect.” PP allows firm l to set a price as low as
marginal cost for a particular consumer, to induce him
to buy product l. This leads to an immediate increase
in the market coverage of firm l, both amongst low-
valuation consumers, and those who were previously
buying product h. In response to this heightened com-
petition from firm l, firm h strategically reduces its
price. This response of firm h, in turn, induces firm l
to lower its own quality to reduce the competition
with firm h and tap some more uncontested marginal
consumers on the left. We demonstrate these effects
in Lemma 2 of the appendix, which also derives the
reaction functions for the two firms.
Of course, in equilibrium, both firms change their
qualities from the no-PP case. If the cost function
is quadratic, we show that both firms reduce their
qualities.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the cost function is
quadratic; that is, cq=Aq2. In equilibrium, when firm l
adopts PP, both firms reduce their qualities compared to the
no-PP case. In particular, qlh = 0388/A and qll = 0164/A.
Because analytic solutions are infeasible in the gen-
eral case, we numerically solve for qualities using a
cost function cq = q, where  > 1. In the numeric
solution, we check that the constraints 0< l < h < 1
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Figure 3 Equilibrium Qualities of Firms h (Left) and l (Right) with cq= q
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are satisfied for each  (so that each firm has a posi-
tive market share in all cases). The results are shown
in Figure 3.10 If the cost function is not too convex
(in particular, ≤ 12), firm h chooses a higher qual-
ity in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is
highly convex  > 12, it chooses a lower quality.
The intuition for this is as follows. PP allows firm l
to charge a price as low as its cost, cl. This lets it pen-
etrate an untapped market segment with lower val-
uations than it is currently serving, as well as make
some headway into the market served by firm h. This
is the “market coverage effect.” Firm h has two com-
petitive responses to this. First, as a result of the price
competition effect, it reduces its price. Second, when
costs are sufficiently convex, it reduces its quality.
By moving towards the low-quality firm, h increases
the uncontested portion of its market. This further
induces firm l to reduce its own quality to mitigate
the more aggressive competition from firm h. How-
ever, if costs are almost linear (i.e., for low values
of ), firm h increases its quality in equilibrium and
increases its price. Though this entails a lower mar-
ket coverage, the nature of the cost function implies
that the profit per unit sold is higher. This “cost of
quality effect” is also critical in determining the new
equilibrium qualities and prices.
3.2. Personalized Pricing Firm Offers
High Quality
We use the superscript h to denote this case. In this
case, firm h knows the type of each consumer, and
hence is willing to price as low as phh= ch if need
be.11 The threshold consumer h obtains the same util-
10 A description of the technique used to solve for the equilibrium
in the no-PP case is contained in the technical appendix.
11 Again, for brevity, we suppress the dependence of the optimal
price functions phh , p
h
l on qh, ql.
ity from either product.12 If phhh > cl, then firm l
would lower its price for this consumer to ensure that
he strictly prefers to buy product l. Hence, it must be
that phhh= cl. Therefore, this consumer is defined by
h = ch − phl /qh − ql. Similarly, l is defined by the
consumer indifferent between buying product l and
not consuming at all. Hence, l = phl /ql. In contrast to
the low-PP case, when firm h adopts PP, it charges a
price monotonic in consumer valuations.
Proposition 3. Suppose that firms choose any quali-
ties qh > ql at Stage 1, with associated costs ch = cqh and
cl = cql, that satisfy (i) ql < qh and (ii) ch < qh. In the
equilibrium of the pricing subgame starting at Stage 2, we
have 0< l < h ≤ 1. Further,
(a) The optimal price of firm l is lower than ch, the
marginal cost of firm h. Specifically, firm l sets
phl =


1
2
(
cl+
ql
qh
ch
)
if
1
2
(
ch−cl
qh−ql
+ ch
qh
)≤1
min
{
ch−qh−ql
cl+ql
2
}
otherwise
(b) Over the market it serves, firm h charges an opti-
mal price monotonically increasing in consumer valua-
tions. Specifically, firm h sets
phh=


ch if  ∈ 0 h	
1
2
(
cl +
ql
qh
ch
)+ qh− ql if  ∈ h1	
Firm h charges a monotonically increasing price
because it faces no competitive threat from firm l in
the region h1	. Interestingly, firm l’s price is lower
than even the marginal cost of firm h, i.e., phl < ch. This
pricing policy enables it to serve a sizable segment of
12 As in the low-PP case, we solve for an interior solution, with
0 < l < h < 1. We show in Lemma 3 in the appendix that the
equilibrium must satisfy this condition.
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the market, despite being a low-quality firm and not
having PP.
Now consider the choice of qualities of Stage 1.
Incorporating the optimal Stage 2 prices leads to the
following profit functions for the firms:
hl qh ql= h− lphl − cl=
chql − qhcl2
2qhqlqh− ql
 (3)
hh qh ql=
∫ 1
h
phh− ch d=
phl + qh− ql − ch2
2qh− ql

(4)
In this case, too, the price-competition effect works
in the same direction: The firm that does not have PP
(here, firm l) reduces its price to compete more effec-
tively. In response to this “price-competition effect,”
firm h raises its quality. We demonstrate this in
Lemma 4 in the appendix.
Of course, in equilibrium, both firms change their
qualities from the no-PP case. We first demonstrate
that with quadratic costs, both firms raise their
qualities.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the cost function is
quadratic; that is, cq=Aq2. In equilibrium, when firm h
adopts PP, both firms raise their qualities compared to the
no-PP case. In particular, qhh = 0444/A and qhl = 0222/A.
However, this is not true for all degrees of con-
vexity of the cost function. As in the low-PP case,
if the cost function is not too convex (in particular,
 ≤ 155), firm l chooses a lower quality in equilib-
rium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex
 > 155, it chooses a higher quality (see Figure 3).
Thus, for a wide range of , both firms increase
their qualities compared to the no-PP case. Here, the
market coverage effect benefits firm h, which can
penetrate into the market of firm l. The competitive
response of firm l takes two dimensions: It reduces its
price (the price-competition effect), and also increases
its quality (to come closer to firm h). This, in turn,
induces firm h to increase its own quality to avoid
head-to-head competition. As in the low-PP case, if
costs are close to linear (i.e., for low values of ),
the firm without PP moves further away in quality.
That is, firm l reduces its quality, with a correspond-
ing reduction in price. This results in lower market
coverage, but a higher profit per unit, due to the cost-
of-quality effect. Therefore, starting from the no-PP
case, if the cost function is convex enough, the non-PP
firm seeks to reduce quality differentiation and come
closer to the PP firm in the quality space. That is, if
the PP firm has a low quality, in equilibrium both
firms end up with lower qualities than previously.
The converse outcome occurs if the PP firm chooses
high quality; that is, both firms end up with higher
qualities. Further, the firm without PP offers a lower
price than the corresponding price in the no-PP case.
3.3. Both Firms Have Personalized Pricing
We denote this case with the superscript b. Suppose
that the firms choose qualities qh and ql at Stage 1.
Then, h = ch − cl/qh − ql, l = cl/ql, and  = ch/qh.
Recall that firm h sells to consumers in the region
h1	 and firm l in the region l h	. As in the
low-PP case,  represents the point beyond which
firms compete for consumers, so that consumers in
the region l 	 are not willing to buy good h at any
price ch or higher.13
Consider Stage 2 of this game, where the firms
choose their price schedule, given qualities qh, ql. Let
pbh be the optimal price charged by firm h to the
consumer of type . This is the price at which he
is exactly indifferent between buying the low-quality
product at cl (the lowest price firm l is willing to
charge) and the high-quality product h at pbh. There-
fore, qh−pbh= ql−cl or pbh= cl+qh−ql. As in
the high-PP case, this price is strictly increasing in .
Consider the price charged by firm l. The pricing
function is similar to the one in the low-PP case, with
the one difference that firm h is willing to price as low
as ch to any consumer. Hence, the optimal price func-
tion for firm l is pbl = ql for  ∈ l 	 and pbl =
ch − hqh − ql for  ∈  h	. As before, in the latter
region, the price of firm l is declining in a consumer’s
willingness to pay. Stepping back to Stage 1, we incor-
porate the optimal Stage 2 prices into the firms’ profit
functions to obtain
bhqh ql=
∫ 1
h
cl + qh− ql− ch d
= qh− ql − ch+ cl
2
2qh− ql
 (5)
bl qh ql =
∫ 
l
ql − cl d+
∫ h

ch− qh− ql− cl d
= chql − qhcl
2
2qhqlqh− ql
 (6)
Comparing Equations (5) and (2), we observe that the
profit function of firm h, when both firms have PP,
is exactly the same as in the case when only firm l
has PP. Hence, firm h’s reaction function in the two
cases is the same as well. Similarly, comparing Equa-
tions (6) and (3), the profit function of firm l, when
both firms have PP, is exactly the same as in the case
when only firm h has PP. Hence, l’s reaction function
in the two cases is the same as well. The analysis of
the previous two cases can now be directly used when
both firms have PP.
We show that when both firms have PP, both firms
choose a lower quality than when only firm h has PP.
13 We show in the proof of Proposition 5 in the online appendix that
the equilibrium satisfies 0< l < h < 1.
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Table 1 Summary of Equilibrium Results When cq= Aq2
Neither firm has PP Low-PP case High-PP case Both firms have PP
Firm h l h l h l h l
Quality 0
410/A 0
199/A 0
388/A 0
164/A 0
444/A 0
222/A 0
4/A 0
2/A
Market coverage 0.279 0.345 0.224 0.612 0.444 0.222 0.4 0.4
Average price 0
227/A 0
075/A 0
201/A 0
056/A 0
247/A 0
074/A 0
2/A 0
06/A
Profit 0
016/A 0
012/A 0
011/A 0
018/A 0
022/A 0
006/A 0
016/A 0
008/A
Consumer surplus 0
047/A 0
045/A 0
049/A 0
12/A
Note that this result does not depend on additional
restrictions on the cost function. In comparing the
qualities to the case when only firm l has PP, we
find that both qualities are higher when the cost func-
tion is convex enough, but lower when the cost func-
tion is not too convex. Numerically, for the function
cq= q, when > 13, both qualities are higher than
in the low-PP case. We analytically prove this latter
result for the quadratic cost function.
Proposition 5. Consider the case in which both firms
have PP.
(i) In equilibrium, both firms offer a lower quality than
in the case where only firm h has PP. That is, qbh < q
h
h and
qbl < q
h
l .
(ii) Suppose that the cost function is quadratic, so
cq=Aq2. Then, in equilibrium, both firms offer a higher
quality than in the case where only firm l has PP. That is,
qbh = 04/A> qlh and qbl = 02/A> qll .
When costs are quadratic, compared to the case
when neither firm had PP, in equilibrium the high-
quality firm lowers its quality and the low-quality
firm raises its quality. Thus, both firms actually come
closer to each other in quality. A subtle consequence
of both firms having PP is that the increase in pric-
ing flexibility levels the playing field. Because both
firms can now price at marginal cost for the threshold
customer, the price competition effect leads to intensi-
fied competition for market share. Further, both have
an incentive to compete more aggressively, so the rel-
ative product differentiation between the two firms
decreases, which in turn increases the market cover-
age of each firm. However, for increasingly convex
cost structures, the additional burden of the cost-of-
quality effect leaves both firms worse off. The inten-
sified price competition implies that consumers are
better off.
4. Firm Profits and Consumer Surplus
In this section, we examine which firms are likely to
adopt PP and the resultant consumer welfare. Sup-
pose that neither firm has PP. We assume that after
one or both firms adopt PP, the quality rankings of
the firms do not change. That is, the low-quality firm,
when neither firm had PP, remains the low-quality
firm when one or both firms have PP. Quality lev-
els are tantamount to brand equity, and significant
changes to quality are likely to be costly. This is espe-
cially true when quality rankings are reversed. By
contrast, local or marginal changes to quality can be
made in a continuous fashion. Hence, we now con-
sider firm l acquiring PP, or firm h acquiring PP,
or both. First, consider the quadratic cost case, with
cq=Aq2. In Table 1, we exhibit equilibria under dif-
ferent settings for this case.
The consumer surplus (CS) shown above is defined
in each of the four cases as
CS=
∫ h
l
ql − pl d+
∫ 1
h
qh− ph d
where pl and ph are, respectively, the prices paid
in equilibrium by a consumer of type  buying good l
and good h.14 For example, in the case when the
PP firm has low quality, we have ph = plh, which
is independent of , and pl = pll, as given in
Proposition 1.
Note that the results in the case when neither firm
has PP correspond exactly to those of Moorthy (1991).
The average price displayed in the table is the aver-
age of the prices paid by different consumers for the
good. In the case when neither firm has PP, all con-
sumers pay the same price. When both firms have PP,
due to the intensified competition, the average price
of both firms is the lowest across all cases. Further,
the overall market coverage is at its highest. Hence,
CS is maximized in this case.
As Table 1 shows, both firms have an incentive
to adopt PP when costs are quadratic, regardless of
whether the other firm also has PP. However, the
firms are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: If both
firms adopt PP, their profits are each lower than in
the no-PP case. Even though there is a market cov-
erage effect that boosts market share, the deleterious
impact of the price competition effect is that the aver-
age price of each sale is lower. Further, due to the cost-
of-quality effect the profits dip, leaving both firms
worse off as a result. We summarize the quadratic
case as follows. The proof follows directly by compar-
ison across the columns in Table 1.
14 Because this CS expression applies to each of the four cases, we
omit the superscript on prices and qualities.
Choudhary et al.: Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation
1128 Management Science 51(7), pp. 1120–1130, © 2005 INFORMS
Figure 4 Profit of Firm l When Firm h Does Not (Left) and Does (Right) Have Personalized Pricing
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Proposition 6. Suppose that costs are quadratic, so
cq=Aq2. Then,
(i) If one firm alone adopts PP, its profit increases com-
pared to the case when neither firm has PP. However, if
both firms have PP, each firm has lower profits than in the
no-PP case.
(ii) CS is highest when both firms have PP. Further, it
is higher when only firm h has PP, compared to the cases
when either firm l alone or neither firm has PP.
Next, consider the case cq = q, where  > 1. As
before, we numerically compare equilibria across the
different cases. We find that CS remains highest in
the case when both firms have PP. This points out
the benefits of competition when there is perfect price
discrimination, in contrast to the scenario where there
is only a monopolist, which results in zero CS.15
Observation 1. For all  > 1, CS is higher when
both firms have PP, as compared to any of the other
cases.
When both firms have PP, firm h charges a price
pbh = cl + qh − ql to its consumers. Compare this
to the price it charges when firm l does not have PP:
phh = phl + qh − ql. If firm l now adopts PP, the
greater competition leads to a lower price for con-
sumers of firm h, and a corresponding increase in
welfare. CS falls compared to the no-PP case if the
PP firm has low quality, but rises if the PP firm has
high quality. When firm l has PP, it extends its market
reach to a segment previously untapped because it
can price as low as marginal cost. However, a segment
of firm l’s consumers receive no surplus, because they
pay a price exactly equal to their willingness to pay.
Conversely, if firm h has PP, it faces competition from
firm l throughout its market segment, and is forced
to concede some surplus to consumers.
Observation 2. For  ∈ 14	, it is a dominant
strategy for firm l to adopt PP. That is, regardless of
whether firm h has PP, firm l should adopt PP.
15 Bhaskar and To (2004) obtain similar results in their framework.
Figure 4 demonstrates the increase in profit to firm l
when it adopts PP. The figure on the left illustrates the
case of neither firm having PP, and the figure on the
right, the case of firm h having PP. We emphasize that
the cost of acquiring a resource to enable PP is not fac-
tored into this calculation. Such a cost can be incorpo-
rated as follows. The vertical gap between the dashed
and solid line indicates the gain to firm l from PP.
It will adopt PP if and only if this gap exceeds the
fixed cost of adopting PP.
Observation 3. Regardless of whether firm l has
PP, firm h should adopt PP only if the cost function
is not too convex. In particular, there exists an  ∈
253	 such that if  >  and firm h adopts PP, its
profits decrease.
Figure 5 demonstrates this result. How can the
profit of firm h decrease when it adopts PP? Recall
that when firm h adopts PP and firm l does not
have PP, firm l responds by reducing its price. This
induces firm h to increase its quality. Increasing qual-
ity is especially costly when the cost function is steep;
indeed, it is costly enough in this case to outweigh
the benefits of charging consumers according to their
willingness to pay. A similar intuition holds when
firm l has PP. If firm h adopts PP in this situation,
the new equilibrium sees both firms at a higher qual-
ity, which is correspondingly costly for firm h. Again,
note that this result does not factor in a cost for imple-
menting PP. With such a cost, firm h has even less
incentive to adopt PP. Together, these results imply
the following.
Observation 4. PP by both firms need not lead to
a prisoner’s dilemma situation in which all firms are
worse off. If both firms adopt PP, then, for a lower
level of convexity of the cost function, both firms have
higher profits compared to the case when neither firm
has PP. However, the market shares increase for both
firms, for all .
The result on profits can be seen by comparing the
profits of the two firms in Figures 4 and 5, between
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Figure 5 Profit of Firm h When Firm l Does Not (Left) and Does (Right) Have Personalized Pricing
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the cases “Neither firm has PP” and “Both firms
have PP.” PP increases the pricing flexibility of both
firms. An obvious consequence of this is more intense
price competition. However, because the firms also
respond by strategically changing qualities, the cost-
of-quality effect plays a crucial role in determining
the net change in profits. This ensures that PP does
not invariably lead to a prisoner’s dilemma.
5. Managerial Implications and
Conclusions
The practice of PP is important in both offline and
online channels. Our results show that an appro-
priate pricing strategy must take into account both
consumers’ willingness to pay and competition in a
particular market segment. Ignoring either one can
result in lower profits. In our model, if the low-quality
firm deploys PP, it is optimal for it to use a non-
monotonic price schedule. Thus, some high-valuation
consumers are charged lower prices than some lower-
valuation consumers. An example of such pricing
comes from the hardware industry for RISC/NT
servers and high-end workstations wherein it is quite
common to charge different prices to different cus-
tomers for the same quality and same quantity. Large
customers are able to extract huge discounts, despite
valuing the product very highly. On the other hand,
smaller enterprises obtain lower discounts because no
other firm competes for their demand (because the
profit margins are much lower). In the latter segment,
manufacturers often price according to the customers’
willingness to pay and in the process capture most of
their surplus. Consequently, they are able to extract
higher profits from some undercontested customers.
Conversely, their margins are also squeezed by some
large customers who play the firms against each other
and win price concessions.
Our model also sheds light on the different prod-
uct quality choices made by firms, given that one
or both firms implement PP. When a low-quality
firm adopts PP, both firms reduce their quality lev-
els in equilibrium. In the IT hardware industry, this
is often done through stripping off some value-
added customer service, such as next-day on-site
repair versus same-day 8-hour repair, or a 99%-
uptime guarantee versus 99.95%.16 Conversely, if the
high-quality firm adopts PP, both firms should aug-
ment the quality levels of their offerings by pro-
viding additional product features or services. For
instance, HP differentiates itself by providing higher
quality, new generation Web-based applications, as
well as clustering and security management software
embedded in the same hardware box. (See http://
www.hp.com/hpinfo/execteam/speeches/fiorina/
oracleapps_02.html.)
The critical issue for managers in vertically differ-
entiated industries to keep in mind in adopting PP
is the interplay between two countervailing effects:
increased market coverage and intensified competi-
tion, given the convexity of the cost function. The
increase in market coverage makes PP attractive.
However, aggravated price competition hurts firms’
profits. Further, optimal qualities of firms change.
Therefore, the net effect of PP also depends on
the nature of the cost function. For a lower level of
convexity of the cost function, both firms have higher
profits compared to the case when neither firm has PP,
and hence, are able to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma
situation. With moderately convex costs,  ∈ 153	,
both low- and high-quality firms have an incentive to
adopt PP, regardless of the other firm’s actions. How-
ever, both firms are better off in the scenario where
neither has PP, as compared to both having PP, result-
ing in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Conversely,
if  > 3, only the low-quality firm will adopt PP
because the high-quality firm reduces its own profit
by adopting PP.
16 The cost difference to the consumer between, say, a 99%-uptime
guarantee and a 99.95% guarantee is substantial, so this difference
is nontrivial.
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Finally, our model also demonstrates that con-
sumers would benefit if higher-quality firms adopt PP.
In the event that all firms adopt PP, consumers would
benefit the most. Thus, we conclude that, in a competi-
tive scenario, increasing knowledge about consumers’
willingness to pay should eventually lead to an overall
increase in consumer welfare.
One limitation of this paper is that we only con-
sider a single product offering by each firm, whereas
in practice firms often offer multiple products. In the
extreme case, one can conceive of firms offering a per-
sonalized quality to each consumer, in addition to
a personalized price. If both firms have the ability
to customize product quality at no additional cost,
Bertrand competition for each consumer is inevitable,
and both firms will be held to zero profit. Hence, a
proper study of customization must therefore incorpo-
rate additional features not considered in our model,
such as horizontal differentiation or differences in the
customization ability of firms. Another limitation is
that we assume that a firm with the ability to per-
sonalize prices knows the willingness to pay of each
consumer for each possible quality level. In practice,
of course, we would expect firms to be less certain
about the valuations of each consumer for each possi-
ble quality level. If the consumer type is observed only
with some noise, the intuition of Chen et al. (2001) sug-
gests that price competition may be softened. Thus,
our results should be interpreted as the solution to an
important limiting case—the case of perfect informa-
tion. Nevertheless, it is an important case to consider
because the effects we identify in this limiting case will
also be present in a general case.
An online appendix to this paper is available at
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
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